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Abstract. This article argues that aWorld Environment Organisation (WEO) does not promise
to enhance international environmental governance. First, we claim that the establishment of an
international organisation alone in a policy ﬁeld currently populated by regimes cannot be
expected to signiﬁcantly improve environmental governance because there is no qualitative
diﬀerence between these two forms of governance institutions. Second, we submit that signiﬁ-
cant improvement of international environmental governance through institutional re-
arrangement must rely on a modiﬁcation of decision-making procedures and/or a change of
institutional boundaries. Third, we develop three principal models of a possible WEO. AWEO
formally providing an umbrella for existing regimes withoutmodifying issue-areas and decision-
making procedures would be largely irrelevant. A WEO integrating decision-making processes
of existing regimes so as to form comprehensive ‘world environment rounds’ of intergovern-
mental bargaining would be largely dysfunctional and prone to a host of negative side-eﬀects. A
‘supranational’ WEO including large-scale use of majority decision-making and far-reaching
enforcement mechanisms across a range of environmental issues might considerably enhance
international environmental governance, but it appears to be grossly utopian. In conclusion, a
WEO cannot be at the same time realistic, signiﬁcant and beneﬁcial for international environ-
mental governance. Available political resources should be invested in advancing existing and
emerging sectoral environmental regimes rather than in establishing a WEO.
Key words: co-operation theory, global governance, international environmental governance,
international institutions, multilateral environmental agreements, regime theory, World
Environment Organisation
Abbreviations: EU – European Union; GATT – General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade;
GMEF – Global Ministerial Environment Forum; ILO – International Labour Organization;
UNECE – United Nations Economic Commission for Europe; UNEP – United Nations
Environment Programme; WEO – World Environment Organisation; WTO – World Trade
Organization
1. Introduction
A World Environment Organisation (WEO) has been proposed by analysts and
policy-makers alike to remedy existing problems of international environmental
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governance. Despite signiﬁcant progress in the past decades, sustainable develop-
ment has not been realised. International environmental problems such as the loss of
biological diversity, climate change or the dispersion of persistent hazardous
chemicals remain largely unresolved (UNEP 2002). The creation of a full-ﬂedged
international organisation is expected to strengthen international environmental
governance, as did the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for
the liberalisation of international trade (Runge 2001; Charnovitz 2002). A WEO
could provide a common roof for a number of existing multilateral environmental
agreements and form a new ‘gravity centre’ of international environmental policy-
making (Esty 1994; Biermann 2000; Esty and Ivanova 2001, 2002; WBGU 2001;
Whalley and Zissimos 2001; for an overview and further references see Biermann
2002, p. 298). The proposal for a WEO is one of several suggestions for strength-
ening ‘Global Environmental Governance’ on which this journal devoted a special
issue in 2002 (Volume 4, No. 4).
Today, international environmental governance takes place predominantly within
numerous independent institutional arrangements. A study conducted for the UN
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro identiﬁed more
than 125 separate international environmental regimes (Sand 1992; also Charnovitz
1996). Five additional environmental agreements have been concluded on average
per year thereafter (Beisheim et al. 1999, pp. 350–351). International agreements
regulate virtually all important regional or global environmental problems. While
they have in many cases resulted in remarkable progress, diﬃculties still abound (e.g.
Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Young 1999; Miles et al. 2001).
Proposals for the establishment of a WEO form part of a broader policy discus-
sion on reforming the institutional framework of international environmental gov-
ernance. The Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GMEF) of the UN
Environment Programme (UNEP) aims at improving co-ordination between inter-
national treaties and other institutions relevant to the environment. Options re-
viewed by the GMEF include proposals to cluster multilateral environmental
agreements, i.e. to integrate several agreements or certain of their parts (Oberthu¨r
2002). The World Summit on Sustainable Development convened in Johannesburg
in summer 2002 endorsed the eﬀorts of the GMEF.1 Gupta (2002) provides an
overview and analysis of further options that have been put forward.
The idea of a WEO is rooted in dissatisfaction with the current arrangements of
international environmental governance and, more importantly, with the lack of
eﬀective environmental protection it has achieved so far. Proponents expect a WEO
to help overcome in particular three major problems of international environmental
politics (e.g. Biermann 2000). The cumbersome process of setting binding interna-
tional standards for the protection of the environment might be facilitated by
bargains across issue-areas and policy ﬁelds (Whalley and Zissimos 2001, 2002).
Supervision and enforcement of the implementation of international environmental
commitments might be enhanced, partly through the mobilisation of additional re-
sources for transfer from North to South to assist developing countries (e.g. Bier-
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mann 2000; Esty and Ivanova 2002). In addition, disruption of international envi-
ronmental governance caused by non-environmental institutions such as the WTO
(Runge 2001; Brack 2002; Charnovitz 2002) and by tensions between diﬀerent
international environmental regimes might be mitigated or avoided. The Kyoto
Protocol’s potential for providing incentives for forestry activities that maximise
carbon sequestration while compromising the objectives of the Convention on
Biological Diversity (Pontecorvo 1999; Jacquemont and Caparro´s 2002) provides an
example of tensions between environmental regimes. Finally, a WEO is expected to
collect and distribute environmental data and analyses (e.g. Biermann 2000; Esty and
Ivanova 2002).
So far, the discussion on the merits of a WEO lacks conceptual foundation.
Advocates of a WEO regularly fail to demonstrate why we should expect a WEO to
fulﬁl the aforementioned functions more eﬀectively than the existing institutional
arrangements or potential other alternatives (Najam 2003). This would require a
conceptual foundation enabling us to assess the governance capacity of varying
international institutions.
This article is intended to provide conceptual foundation for the debate by
examining the principal contribution that a WEO could make to enhancing inter-
national environmental governance from an institutionalist perspective. In particu-
lar, we employ co-operation and regime theory, which have greatly advanced our
understanding of governance through international environmental institutions over
the past 20 years or so (e.g. Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Gehring 1994; Young
1994; Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoﬀ 1998). We do not engage in a comprehensive
review of individual proposals for establishing a WEO (for overviews see Biermann
2002, p. 298; Charnovitz 2002, pp. 324–329). Instead, we investigate, on the basis of
co-operation and regime theory, ways in which a WEO might modify international
environmental governance.
We make three claims. First, we argue that the establishment of an international
organisation alone in a policy ﬁeld currently populated by regimes cannot be ex-
pected to signiﬁcantly improve environmental governance because there is no
qualitative diﬀerence between these two forms of governance institutions. Organi-
sations do not have at their disposal additional properties or instruments that are
relevant for successful governance and that would not be available in international
regimes (Section 2).
Second, we submit that any signiﬁcant improvement of international environ-
mental governance through institutional re-arrangement can rely on a modiﬁcation
of decision-making procedures and/or a change of institutional boundaries. Modi-
ﬁcation of decision-making procedures changes the ability of actors to inﬂuence
outcomes. Modiﬁcation of the boundaries of the issue-area governed aﬀects
opportunities to link issues and conclude mutually beneﬁcial deals. In contrast, an
institutional reform cannot be expected to help ensure an eﬀective enforcement of
international environmental commitments. Irrespective of decision-making proce-
dures and institutional boundaries, non-cooperating states cannot be excluded from
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the beneﬁts of international environmental governance, because it is predominantly
about the protection of global or regional commons (Section 3).
Third, based upon the analysis of three principal models we argue that a WEO
cannot be at the same time realistic, signiﬁcant and beneﬁcial for international
environmental governance. A WEO formally providing an umbrella for existing
regimes without modifying existing decision-making procedures would be largely
irrelevant. A WEO integrating decision-making processes of existing regimes so as to
form comprehensive ‘world environment rounds’ of intergovernmental bargaining
would be largely dysfunctional and prone to a host of negative side-eﬀects. A
‘supranational’ WEO including large-scale use of majority decision-making and far-
reaching enforcement mechanisms across a range of environmental issues might
considerably enhance international environmental governance, but it appears to be
grossly utopian. From an institutionalist perspective, the creation of a WEO may
therefore result in eﬃciency gains at best (common use of secretariats, co-ordination
of reporting). Political and ﬁnancial resources available promise greater return if
invested in advancing decision-making in existing environmental regimes (Section 4).
2. The Distinction between Regimes and Organisations – Fiction rather than Reality
The establishment of a World Environment Organisation cannot per se be expected
to improve international environmental governance. Relevant proposals are in large
part inspired by the fact that international environmental politics is predominantly
based upon hundreds of separately established international regimes and does not
possess a central organisation as do other areas such as international trade (Esty
1994; Runge 2001). However, there is no evidence supporting the claim implicit in
these proposals that an organisation might per se be more powerful or better suited
for successful governance than a regime (Najam 2003).
International environmental governance is already supported by international
organisations and international regimes. Although the latter prevail, both forms are
relevant. An international regime is generally based upon one or several interna-
tional treaties and related instruments. Hence, international climate policy is made
within the global climate regime based upon the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol. Other regimes address such problems as the
depletion of the ozone layer, transboundary trade in hazardous wastes, trade in
endangered species (CITES), or the protection of regional seas such as the North
East Atlantic, the Baltic or the Mediterranean seas. International organisations are
commonly considered as actors (Abott and Snidal 1998) and deﬁned by reference to
their secretariats and their ability to enter into legal contracts (e.g. Keohane 1989,
pp. 3–4; Young 1994, pp. 163–183; Barnett and Finnemore 1999). They also play an
important role in international environmental governance. The International Mar-
itime Organization (IMO) hosts a number of agreements for the protection of the
marine environment, WHO elaborates air quality standards, FAO manages ﬁsh
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resources. Last, but not least, UNEP – despite the fact that it is not a specialised
agency but only a UN programme – has promoted the elaboration of several
international environmental regimes since the early 1970s.
International regimes and international organisations are in many respects very
similar (Simmons and Martin 2002, p. 194) and do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer in their
governance capacity. They both constitute ‘‘persistent and connected sets of rules
and practices that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expec-
tations’’ (Levy, Young and Zu¨rn 1995) and provide their members with the necessary
forums and communication channels to elaborate collectively binding decisions in
accordance with established procedures (see also Abbott and Snidal 1998, pp. 15–
16). They also do not diﬀer systematically with respect to their patterns of gover-
nance. While decision-making in many international organisations remains limited
by the requirements of consensus, the procedures in various international environ-
mental regimes are surprisingly far-reaching and include delegation of decision-
making authority (see Section 3.1).
The formal characteristics of the international organisations mentioned above are
not suited for a clear-cut distinction and they do not refer to elements that matter for
eﬀective governance. While the ability to enter into an external contract under
international law may be relevant for some speciﬁc tasks, it does not generally
increase the governance ability of an organisation, because successful governance
regularly depends on establishing co-operation between the members of an institu-
tion and thus on internal decision-making. Likewise, the success of international
governance cannot be attributed to the existence of secretariats. For example, the
particular strength of the WTO is usually not attributed to its secretariat but to its
decision-making apparatus, in particular to its rigid and inﬂuential dispute settle-
ment mechanism (Hoekman and Kostecki 1995, pp. 44–50; Jackson 1999, pp. 107–
137).
What is more, if one were to equal international organisations with secretariats,
the distinction between international regimes and organisations would become
completely blurred. Not only organisations but also regimes possess their own
bureaucracies. Consequently, both regimes and existing organisations comprise
substantive rules and obligations as well as some sort of a secretariat. The creation of
a WEO would amount to the integration of the secretariat services of diﬀerent
existing institutions, for example UNEP and a number of international environ-
mental agreements. Such a step could hardly be expected to signiﬁcantly contribute
to mitigating any of the major deﬁciencies of international environmental gover-
nance.
International organisations do not generally govern broader issue-areas than
international regimes, and they are not more successful. Many established interna-
tional organisations, such as WTO, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
UN (FAO), WHO or the ILO govern large issue-areas. However, others are more
specialised, such as the World Customs Organization (WCO) that administers cus-
toms codes used in international trade. In contrast, some international regimes such
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as the regime on climate change and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) manage an enormous scope of inter-connected issues
without establishing a formal organisation. At the same time, eﬀective organisations
such as the WTO contrast with less successful ones such as the ILO and with a
number of remarkably successful international environmental regimes (e.g. Haas,
Keohane and Levy 1993; Victor, Rustiala and Skolnikoﬀ 1998; Young 1999; Miles
et al. 2001).
The transformation of an international regime into an organisation may largely
amount to an act of symbolic policy-making because it does not per se increase
governance capacity (see also Charnovitz 2002, p. 337). The mere fact that the
original General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT), which had evolved over
almost 50 years, was converted into the WTO in 1994 did not signiﬁcantly enhance
the governance capacity of the institution. Likewise, environmental governance
would not signiﬁcantly change if the regime for the protection of the global climate
or the regime for the protection of the Baltic Sea (Helsinki Commission) were
transformed into small international organisations. Hence, labelling an existing
international regime (agreement) as an organisation is largely a symbolic act. We do
not want to claim that symbolic politics is irrelevant (Edelman 1967). States may
have good reasons to take symbolic action such as the transformation of the Con-
ference for Security and Cooperation in Europe into the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe without enhancing the authority of the institution after
the end of the cold war to symbolise the new security situation in Europe. From the
perspective of co-operation theory, however, symbolic action cannot be expected to
systematically enhance the governance capacity of a given institution.
3. The Decision-Making Capacity of International Institutions
An institutional reform will only be relevant for the eﬀectiveness of international
environmental governance, if it signiﬁcantly aﬀects the decision-making capacity of
international institutions. In this section, we argue that this factor may be inﬂuenced
by the design of decision-making processes (Section 3.1) and by the delimitation of
the areas governed (Section 3.2).
3.1. THE DESIGN OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
International governance institutions constitute decision-making apparatuses that
produce collectively binding decisions and supervise their implementation. Active
governance intended to change undesired behaviour and improve sub-optimal out-
comes requires collective decision-making (see also Keohane 1993; Gehring 2002).
As a group, the actors choose how they individually ought to behave in order to
bring about a desired co-operative outcome. Hence, collective decision-making
constitutes the core of active governance. All international institutions encompass
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their own decision-making processes (see Levy, Young and Zu¨rn 1995) that enable
their members to adapt and develop these institutions dynamically (Gehring 1994).
Simple ad hoc negotiations are the least demanding mechanism for the making of
collective decisions under the ‘anarchic’ conditions of the international system. This
mechanism is frequently resorted to by states in international relations. It allows
governments individually to pursue their own distributive interests based on their
bargaining power, and collectively to mould norms. It is generally assumed that the
distribution of the beneﬁts of an arrangement emerging from a bargaining process
will largely reﬂect the power constellation existing outside the negotiations (Elster
1989, pp. 50–96).
Co-ordination by intergovernmental negotiations is, however, subject to several
limitations. First, negotiations are frequently slow and cumbersome. Even if all
participants intend to reach agreement, they must distribute co-operation gains and
will compete for the biggest possible ‘piece of the cake’ (Lax and Sebenius 1986).
Second, the ability to co-ordinate by means of simple negotiations decreases with the
complexity of the negotiating agenda. If a negotiation addresses many intercon-
nected issues, participants will face increasing diﬃculties in assessing concessions and
proposed deals. These diﬃculties will be exacerbated, if the issues under negotiation
are marked by scientiﬁc uncertainty that characterises many environmental issues.
As a consequence, transaction costs of negotiations and the likelihood of failure
increase. Third, the dynamic change inherent in many economic, technological and
environmental policy areas requires that agreements be ﬂexibly adapted to changing
circumstances, which may be diﬃcult to attain in ad hoc negotiations. Fourth, ra-
tional actors can be interested in establishing particularly credible commitments
binding their partners and themselves by eﬀective dispute resolution and sanctioning
mechanisms, which can hardly be provided for in simple negotiations.
The limitations inherent in co-ordination by simple negotiations provide incen-
tives for rational actors to devise more ambitious institutional arrangements. They
may do so in at least three ways. First, participating actors may postpone some of
the issues to be dealt with to later negotiating rounds in order to reduce complexity
or to enhance the adaptability of the institution. They may enter into ‘‘incomplete
contracts’’ (Williamson 1985), which regulate only the most pertinent aspects of an
issue and postpone everything else to later decisions. For example, parties to the
Montreal Protocol of 1987 agreed to periodically review and further develop the
phase-out schedule of ozone-depleting substances such as chloroﬂuorocarbons
(CFCs). And the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was
intended to provide an institutionalised forum for subsequent negotiations on
emission reduction obligations. Actors thus tend to create enduring negotiating
processes. Later negotiating rounds inescapably take place within an institutiona-
lised context, which inﬂuences the preferences of the participants and makes the
development of the institution path-dependent (Young 1994; Pierson 1996). If a
considerable number of similar decisions with a limited scope are to be taken over
time, general criteria may evolve that guide these decisions, limit the room for
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manoeuvre in the negotiations and further a transition to an exchange of reasonable
arguments (Risse 2000) instead of pure bargaining based on power.
Second, actors may create specialised decision-making processes (e.g. scientiﬁc
assessments, non-compliance procedures, or simple negotiating sub-groups) that
focus on some aspects of the entire decision load and free them from doing every-
thing at the same time within the same process. In this case, the overall package is
elaborated within a number of parallel or consecutive negotiation processes with a
limited scope that fulﬁl complementary functions and establish a division of labour.
The resulting specialisation within country delegations frequently promotes agree-
ment, because it supports recourse to accepted expert knowledge and encourages the
emergence of ‘‘epistemic communities’’ (Haas 1992). Even if, as is frequently the
case, the sub-agreement forms part of the overall negotiation package that needs to
be adopted by consensus (‘‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’’), the rele-
vance of procedural rules increases and the ability of the participants to resort to
their bargaining power outside the negotiations is limited. For example, the scien-
tiﬁc, technological and economic assessment panels established within the frame-
work of the Montreal Protocol proved to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
negotiations on the phase out of ozone-depleting substances, although they consti-
tuted merely advisory bodies with no formal decision-making powers (Parson 2003).
Likewise, international climate negotiations regularly proceed in a number of sep-
arate contact groups addressing diﬀerent items of the negotiating agenda. Speciali-
sation of negotiation processes facilitates a transition from interest-based bargaining
to an exchange of reasoned arguments (arguing).
Finally, actors may forgive their veto power that would otherwise enable them to
block unacceptable decisions by subjecting themselves to majority decision-making
or to decisions by committees with limited membership. Delegation of decision-
making authority will be possible even under the conditions of the current inter-
national system, if the individual decisions are linked so closely that they can only be
accepted or rejected in their entirety and a ‘‘selective exit’’ (Weiler 1991, p. 2412) is
excluded. ‘Horizontal’ decision-making based upon the consensus of all participating
actors can be supplemented by a ‘vertical’ component, provided that the overall
package creates a net beneﬁt for all participants.
The decision-making procedures of several international environmental regimes
are surprisingly far-reaching and include delegation of decision-making authority.
Member states of the regime for the protection of the ozone layer may adopt binding
adjustments of emission reduction commitments by a qualiﬁed majority, and an
Executive Committee composed of seven developing countries and seven indus-
trialised countries decides on the allocation of ﬁnancial resources for the phase-out
of ozone depleting substances in the South (DeSombre and Kauﬀman 1996). In the
International Whaling Commission and in the international regime on trade in
endangered species, decisions on catch quota and the listing of endangered species
respectively are taken by majority, as are far-reaching decisions in other environ-
mental regimes (Churchill and Ulfstein 2000, pp. 638–641). In an increasing number
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of international environmental regimes, separate procedures and committees have
also been established to identify and address cases of non-compliance. The com-
pliance committee under the Kyoto Protocol even is to decide on signiﬁcant sanc-
tions (Churchill and Ulfstein 2000, pp. 643–647; Ehrmann 2000; Oberthu¨r and Marr
2002).
While diﬀerentiation of negotiation processes increases the autonomy of the
institution vis-a`-vis its member states and reduces their ability to control decisions, it
enhances the decision-making capacity of an international institution. Rational ac-
tors will trade oﬀ the gains from more ﬂexible decision-making against the (partial)
loss of control over the content of institutionally produced decisions (Koremenos,
Lipson and Snidal 2001). In simple ad hoc negotiations, the participants constitute
the only source of inﬂuence on results. If decisions are taken within an established
institution, they will be inﬂuenced by prior decisions. If they are made in a network
of specialised negotiating groups, they may be aﬀected by expert considerations. If
collectively binding decisions are taken by a majority or specialised committees with
limited membership, they will not require consent by all member states and may not
even require consent by any member.
Decision-making arrangements may be improved within existing international
environmental agreements without founding a World Environment Organisation.
Existing arrangements are tailor-made for addressing particular governance prob-
lems and reﬂect the willingness of their members to trade oﬀ inﬂuence against an
increased overall decision-making capacity. International environmental regimes
develop over time and their arrangements can be adapted to new needs. While there
is room for further improvement, progress is frequently precluded by the resistance
of some member states based on parochial interests. It is diﬃcult to see how a WEO
could systematically contribute to overcoming this resistance.
3.2. THE DELIMITATION OF PROBLEM AREAS
The issue-areas governed by international institutions are not externally given, they
are socially constructed by the participants in the process of their interaction (Haas
1975). International negotiations cannot address all co-operation problems pending
between states simultaneously, because the multitude of issues would be impossible
to handle. Governments can negotiate about almost anything, but not about
everything at the same time in the framework of a single negotiating round.
Therefore, they identify certain problems to be dealt with in, and exclude others
from, a particular negotiating round. The issue-areas governed by international
institutions are always ‘‘artiﬁcially’’ delimited. Their boundaries are contingent, i.e.
they could have been drawn diﬀerently. In bilateral negotiations, the participants can
enhance the scope for co-operation by enlarging the issue-area and creating package
deals that are composed of partial deals with an asymmetric distribution of beneﬁts
(Tollison and Willet 1979). In multilateral negotiations, a deliberate expansion of the
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agenda is more diﬃcult to achieve, because the number of bilateral relations and of
unintended side-eﬀects to be taken into account increase exponentially with the
number of participating actors. As a result, the delimitation of multilateral issue-
areas usually develops around a substantive core and is frequently subject to pro-
tracted pre-negotiations (Gross Stein 1989).
The delimitation of an issue-area has far-reaching consequences for the ensuing
negotiation process. Adding or subtracting issues (and parties) will change the
constellation of interests within the negotiation process and determine the potential
for co-operation (Sebenius 1983). The delimitation of an issue-area establishes
eﬀective limits for the attention of the participants (Scharpf 1991) so that actors
jointly accept the partition of reality in order to limit the complexity of the respective
negotiating agenda. As long as the negotiating partners accept it, an actor does not
have an incentive to depart from the deﬁnition unilaterally, even if he would have
preferred diﬀerent boundaries. Accordingly, the participating actors will deﬁne their
preferences in the negotiations with regard to the issues under consideration therein,
while all other issues are diﬃcult to introduce and may therefore be ignored for the
time being.
Actors participating in negotiations are faced with the challenge to collectively
optimise the delimitation of an issue-area so as to enhance the opportunities for
successful co-operation and the prospect of achieving a mutually accepted outcome.
An optimal delimitation of an issue-area will avoid two pathologies. A very narrow
deﬁnition promises a manageable scope of negotiations, but involves the risk of
providing too little potential for co-operation and trade-oﬀs (Whalley and Zissimos
2001, 2002). In contrast, a very broad deﬁnition will provide ample room for link-
ages and trade-oﬀs between actors, but creates the risk that the negotiating partners
are overwhelmed by the complexity of too many problems. The suitable scope of an
issue-area depends upon the particularities of the issues at stake.
Some issue-areas are comparatively broadly deﬁned in order to facilitate the
emergence of numerous small-scale co-operation projects which might not have been
born, or which would not survive, separately. The International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO), for example, has helped adopt several hundred conventions deﬁning
minimum social and labour standards (de la Cruz, Potobsky and Swepston 1996) for
which states might not have gathered and attended separate conferences and
established independent supervisory mechanisms. The same is true for the World
Health Organization which addresses a broad range of issues. In these cases,
transaction costs may be assumed to be high as compared to co-operation gains.
In other cases, broad-range international institutions have increased the prospects
of beneﬁcial trade-oﬀs. International trade, for example, is based on the systematic
exploitation of comparative advantages. A country will specialise in the production
and export of those products in which it is competitive, whereas it will import those
products which it cannot produce competitively. Despite some intra-industry trade,
liberalising just trade in cars would not lend itself to international co-operation
because producers and exporters of cars would beneﬁt from this step, but not the
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importing countries. The integration of diﬀerent product markets creates signiﬁ-
cantly more room for mutually beneﬁcial co-operation. The same is true for the
linkage of trade in goods (GATT) with trade in services (GATS) and the protection
of intellectual property (TRIPs). Hence, international trade is regulated by a single
international institution, namely WTO (Hoekman and Kostecki 1995), and not by a
set of separate product regimes.
The striking institutional fragmentation of international environmental politics
reﬂects the high political salience of environmental issues and their particular
problem structure. Unlike trade policy, environmental co-operation projects do not
require integration because most international and global environmental issues ad-
dress the protection of common goods and encompass a prisoners’ dilemma con-
stellation of interests. They can be regulated in separate co-operative arrangements
that ensure mutual beneﬁts for the members. For example, all members of the
international ozone regime or the regime on biological diversity beneﬁt from an
enhanced protection of the ozone layer and an improved conservation of nature (in
the case of developing countries partially ensured by side-payments).
Unlike international health and labour protection policies, environmental co-
operation projects are usually suﬃciently important to be institutionalised separately
from existing institutions. Transaction costs involved in achieving co-operation are
reduced by a number of existing international organisations or semi-independent
organisational structures. Existing organisations such as UNEP (protection of the
ozone layer, transboundary movements of hazardous wastes), the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE; long-range transboundary air pollu-
tion in Europe), the UN General Assembly (climate change), and IMO (pollution
from ships) have supported the emergence of most international environmental re-
gimes. Compared to the huge investments and far-reaching changes of administra-
tive procedures required to implement international environmental commitments,
transaction costs related to the maintenance of separate institutions are small.
Hence, even international environmental regimes created within the framework of
international organisations such as those mentioned above regularly gain institu-
tional autonomy from their parent institutions (Churchill and Ulfstein 2000).
The institutional fragmentation of international environmental governance indi-
cates a strength rather than a weakness of environmental co-operation. While the
delimitation of issue-areas governed by international institutions is subject to design
eﬀorts by the actors involved, it is not entirely incidental. In general, issue-areas are to
ensure mutual beneﬁts for the participants in order to enable eﬀective governance. A
wrong delimitation of an issue-area can render co-operation impossible. The multi-
tude of well-functioning environmental institutions indicates that actors have, for the
most part, succeeded in deﬁning viable issue-areas in international environmental
governance and that an integration of issue-areas is not required in order to ensure
mutual beneﬁts of the parties involved. In Section 4.2, we will turn in more detail to
the question of whether an integration of issue-areas may nevertheless have the po-
tential of enhancing international environmental governance.
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4. Options for a World Environment Organisation: Three Models
The idea of a more encompassing WEO is closely related to the integration of
environmental issue-areas. Neither the mere transformation of individual regimes
into single-issue organisations nor the re-design of their decision-making procedures
correspond to the idea of a WEO and are thus considered here. The organisation is
generally expected to form the institutional core of international environmental
governance. Consequently, it would have to provide the home for a number of
international environmental regimes such as the regimes on global climate change,
for the protection of the ozone layer and for the preservation of biodiversity.
In this section, we develop three basic models for a future WEO. While an almost
unlimited number of options exist, the speciﬁc design of a WEO will follow one of
these models (for similar distinctions see Biermann 2000, 2001; WBGU 2001). The
models diﬀer with respect to the two parameters discussed in the preceding section,
namely the decision-making processes and the delimitation of the issue-area(s)
governed. Actors could create a formal umbrella organisation without changing
issue-areas and decision-making procedures of existing regimes substantively (Sec-
tion 4.1). They could also integrate existing issue-areas more substantively without
introducing signiﬁcantly diﬀerent decision-making procedures (Section 4.2). Finally,
they could both integrate issue-areas and fundamentally re-organise decision-making
therein (Section 4.3).
4.1. UN MODEL: AN UMBRELLA ORGANISATION
States could establish a World Environment Organisation limited to providing a
formal umbrella for existing sector-speciﬁc environmental regimes. It would leave
substantively untouched the current institutional structure of international envi-
ronmental governance. The established boundaries of the issue-areas governed by
international regimes and their existing decision-making procedures would remain
unchanged. The organisation could stimulate international environmental co-oper-
ation by lowering the threshold of regime building and reduce transaction costs, e.g.
by oﬀering constant secretariat services, or fulﬁlling certain auxiliary functions.
Many proposals for establishing a WEO (Biermann 2000; Esty and Ivanova 2002)
emphasise these aspects, that are also a major focus of proposals for ‘clustering’
multilateral environmental agreements (Oberthu¨r 2002). A WEO designed in this
way would follow the model of the United Nations which also provides a compar-
atively loose umbrella for a number of rather independent regulatory activities in
separate issue-areas such as human rights or the law of the sea (Mingst and Karns
2000; White 2002).
A WEO following the UN model would not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the governance
capacity of institutions making international environmental policy. The currently
separate environmental issue-areas would not be integrated, because the sector-
speciﬁc decision-making processes would remain in place. The participating actors
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would continue to determine their preferences in relation to those issues falling inside
the respective issue-areas, while ignoring other issues. Opportunities for co-operation
would continue to arise exclusively as a result of these sector-speciﬁc preferences. If
decision-making proceeded separately for each issue-area, although within the
framework of an umbrella organisation, negotiators would not receive additional
incentives to co-ordinate their sector-speciﬁc activities and to look for possible issue-
linkages or for package deals cutting across the boundaries of established issue-
areas. Those negotiating climate change would continue to focus on measures to
stabilise the global climate, while members of the regime on biological diversity
would continue to concentrate on preserving biodiversity. Whereas an exchange of
information may be facilitated, resulting tensions between both regimes regarding
forestry activities (maximisation of carbon sequestration versus conservation of
biological diversity) would persist. Likewise, the mechanisms for supervising and
facilitating implementation such as non-compliance procedures and other functional
bodies would not signiﬁcantly change, because they would remain sectorally or-
ganised.
A WEO constructed after the UN model could be expected to realise limited
eﬃciency gains at best, but it would not make a signiﬁcant contribution to the
solution of problems of international environmental governance related to decision-
making, implementation and co-ordination. A certain potential for combining
certain auxiliary functions of environmental regimes (e.g., reporting, review of
implementation) might exist, but gains would be moderate (Oberthu¨r 2002). The
bigger problems of international environmental governance could not be solved
because this WEO would not signiﬁcantly change the delimitation of existing issue-
areas or the design of the related decision-making processes. The creation of an
umbrella organisation would thus largely be a matter of symbolic politics.
4.2. WTO MODEL: CREATING COMPREHENSIVE WORLD ENVIRONMENT ROUNDS
Alternatively, a WEO could systematically integrate issue-areas so far governed by
separate international environmental regimes without abandoning the familiar
intergovernmental structure. Issue-areas will be integrated, if the speciﬁc decision-
making processes of existing and future international environmental regimes, in
particular their annual or biennial conferences of the parties, are merged into more
encompassing negotiating rounds. International environmental policy would then be
developed in recurring ‘global environmental rounds’. This design follows the ap-
proach of the WTO, because the regulation of world trade is developed in com-
prehensive world trade rounds (Hoekman and Kostecki 1995, pp. 12–20).
In contrast to the UN model, such a WEO would have a substantial impact on
international environmental governance. Members would determine their prefer-
ences related to a broader negotiating agenda taking into account additional options
for package deals and trade-oﬀs. They might also more easily detect, and might
attempt to avoid, negative side-eﬀects of a given regulation on other policies pursued
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within the same institution. However, these potentially positive eﬀects on interna-
tional environmental governance contrast with important drawbacks.
The increased potential for issue-linkage resulting from the integration of issue-
areas is unlikely to help advance international environmental governance. Whalley
and Zissimos (2001, 2002) rightly insist that increased opportunities for issue-link-
ages and side-payments facilitate agreement in international negotiations. However,
issue-linkage will only be helpful, if asymmetries in the distribution of costs and
beneﬁts are complementary across issues so that diﬀerent actors beneﬁt (most) from
co-operation on diﬀerent subjects and all actors equally beneﬁt from the overall
package. Unfortunately, complementary interests, which characterise trade negoti-
ations, do not systematically exist across diﬀerent issue-areas in international envi-
ronmental policy. For example, it is unlikely that diﬃculties in the international
co-operation to combat climate change would be more easily overcome, if negotia-
tions were combined with those on ozone depletion, biodiversity or other regimes.
Complementarity of interests does not exist because the United States is currently
the laggard in many, if not most, global environmental issues (Paarlberg 1999). The
US can hardly be expected to accept stringent controls on greenhouse gas emissions
in order to ensure an eﬀective protection of, for example, the ozone layer and co-
operation on persistent organic pollutants. If this situation gave way to a comple-
mentarity of interests, it would be incidental and temporary and could not be
expected to provide a ﬁrm foundation for long-term co-operation.
Beneﬁts from an integration of issue-areas are limited because international
environmental governance is predominantly about the preservation of collective
goods rather than club goods. Free international trade has the properties of a club
good that is accessible only to the members of the club (Cornes and Sandler 1999).
States are eﬀectively excluded from reaping the beneﬁts of a liberalised world trade
unless they open their own markets (Hoekman and Kostecki 1995, pp. 27–30). In
contrast, environmental protection is frequently a collective good. It will be diﬃcult
to prevent a state from taking a free ride if it cannot be excluded from enjoying the
collective good of environmental protection. Countries refusing to co-operate to
protect the ozone layer cannot be excluded from the beneﬁts of a stabilised ozone
layer. Accordingly, states have an incentive to stay out of costly co-operation (Olson
1965) that will increase with every issue that a country opposes. Thus, a WEO
following the WTO model threatens to undermine its own basis and endangers gains
so far realised through sector-speciﬁc co-operation in international regimes.
Likewise, issue-linkage through integration of issue-areas does not help pressure
non-co-operating states and enforce implementation of international environmental
commitments. Proponents of environmental protection cannot credibly threaten to
make protection of the ozone layer conditional on US acceptance of controls on
greenhouse gases, because realising this threat would harm themselves at least as
much as the opponent. The same logic applies to the enforcement of obligations.
While disregard of obligations within WTO may be eﬀectively prosecuted by
excluding non-complying countries from beneﬁts in any suitable area of interna-
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tional trade, this threat is usually not available in environmental institutions: A
country’s non-compliance with obligations to conserve biological diversity cannot
usefully be responded to by not complying with commitments to protect the ozone
layer.
Modest additional opportunities for issue-linkages and side-payments contrast
with a signiﬁcantly enhanced complexity of negotiations, which makes it more dif-
ﬁcult to reach agreement. If states had unlimited information processing capacity,
they would best deal with all problems pending among them at the same time. In
reality, complexity creates signiﬁcant impediments for decision-making and reaching
agreement, because more issues are to be dealt with in a single negotiation process.
Experience from available precedents suggests that complexity is a factor that seri-
ously limits eﬀective decision-making and signiﬁcantly slows down the process. The
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations took some 8 years (1986–1994: Hoekman and
Kostecki 1995, pp. 19–20), while the negotiations at the Third UN Conference on the
Law of the Sea lasted even for 9 years (1973–1982; Sebenius 1984).
In several respects, a WTO-like WEO does not change the status quo at all. It is
unlikely that it is apt to mobilise the additional ﬁnancial resources needed to rein-
force the capacity of developing countries to implement international obligations
and develop eﬀective environmental policies. There is no indication that industria-
lised countries might be more willing to provide additional ﬁnancial resources to
assist implementation of international environmental commitments in developing
countries if issue-areas were integrated. Why should they be prepared to do so only
because the ozone regime has, for example, been merged with the climate change
regime and become part of a larger institutional complex? It should also be noted
that the Global Environment Facility (GEF) has already been established as an
overarching institution providing ﬁnancial assistance supporting the implementation
of several international environmental agreements (Oberthu¨r 2002, pp. 324–325).
A WTO-like WEO is also unlikely to help resolve the co-ordination problems
existing between environmental and economic institutions such as the WTO (Brack
2002). Several proposals for a WEO are focusing on the interface between economic
and environmental governance (e.g. Runge 2001). However, it is diﬃcult to see how
a larger environmental organisation could ensure that agreements between WTO
members do not undercut environmental regulation. The diﬀerence in power be-
tween the WTO and international environmental governance will continue irre-
spective of the existence of a WEO because the WTO can grant and withdraw trade
advantages, while any environmental institution supplying a collective good cannot
exclude individual actors from beneﬁting (see above). Where particular opportunities
for enforcement exist, they can be used without establishing a WEO. Side-payments
and technical assistance can be withdrawn, with the signiﬁcant drawback that such
action only aﬀects the poorer members and diminishes their willingness to co-
operate. More importantly, several multilateral environmental agreements, including
the Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer and the 1973 Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),
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allow for authorising or imposing speciﬁc trade sanctions in response to non-com-
pliance (Charnovitz 1996). Pressure on the WTO (and other economic institutions)
will largely depend on the determination of the members of these regimes to eﬀec-
tively implement such sanctions. It seems that the WTO, through the jurisdiction of
its Dispute Settlement Body, increasingly accepts appropriately designed environ-
mental trade sanctions (Charnovitz 1998), so that, in practice, trade sanctions (and
other enforcement options) can already be employed by the parties to environmental
regimes. It is diﬃcult to see how the establishment of a WEO could add signiﬁcant
new opportunities in this respect.
Finally, a WTO-like WEO could make a diﬀerence for co-ordination problems
between the environmental institutions integrated into the WEO, but the beneﬁts to
be reaped would remain very limited. A WEO would facilitate exchange of infor-
mation and co-ordination across environmental issue-areas contributing to a better
integration of approaches. However, recent research suggests that tensions between
environmental institutions are relatively rare and have been handled relatively suc-
cessfully within the current fragmented system of environmental institutions (Obe-
rthu¨r and Gehring 2003). The beneﬁts to be realised from a better integration of
environmental issue-areas are therefore moderate at best.
Altogether, it is highly questionable whether the beneﬁts that may be reaped in this
area justify the costs and dangers of increased complexity and unproductive issue
linkage. While a WEO following the WTO model would signiﬁcantly change envi-
ronmental policy-making, it does not promise signiﬁcant progress towards the res-
olution of the major problems of international environmental governance. To the
contrary, it is likely to be dysfunctional, because it creates disincentives rather than
incentives for accepting additional environmental commitments and threatens to
overwhelm negotiators with an undesirable complexity of issues that would retard
action.
4.3. EU MODEL: DELEGATING EXTENSIVE COMPETENCIES TO A WEO
To avoid the negative consequences of the WTO model, a WEO could both integrate
the issue-areas of existing environmental regimes and systematically reorganise the
related decision-making processes. It would then be shaped after the European
Union (EU). The EU constitutes a single encompassing institution governing an
extensive area comprising numerous policies. In principle, it thus provides extensive
opportunities for linking issues and facilitating co-operation by side-payments.
Nevertheless, decision-making is not overwhelmed by an overly complex agenda of
issues because opportunities for linkage are severely limited in practice. Despite
grand bargains on the European Treaties (Moravcsik 1998), there are no compre-
hensive negotiation rounds. Instead, decisions are largely delegated to subsidiary
decision-making processes, supranational organs (European Commission, European
Court of Justice) and independent bodies or agencies (Majone 1997). Each of these
processes is specialised on some issues, so that complexity is reduced. Their decision-
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making capacity is enhanced because they regularly employ majority decision-
making, and in many cases member states do not play the dominant role any more.
Moreover, decisions are not part of large packages to be agreed upon at the end, but
enter into force separately. In order to avoid that states only adhere to agreements
that are to their liking, the option of ‘‘selective exit’’ (Weiler 1991) is ﬁrmly closed,
and member states must either accept all commitments of the institution or sacriﬁce
their membership.
A WEO following the EU model would promise to make a substantial contri-
bution to resolving the main problems of international environmental governance
(Pollack 2003). First, majority voting and delegation of decision-making authority
would reduce the decision-making problems notorious in international institutions.
It would not only prevent individual actors from blocking decisions, but produce
decisions that are less inﬂuenced by the parochial interests of individual states.
Second, the institutional design would require, and thus allow, that member states
establish powerful supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, because the institution
would comprise numerous decisions with asymmetrical distributional eﬀects that
would not have gained the support by all members concerned. Otherwise, eﬀective
implementation of commitments could not be ensured. Third, a ‘supranational’
WEO would allow for the establishment of overarching criteria and collision rules to
be followed in the subordinated specialised decision-making processes in order to
resolve co-ordination problems and potential conﬂicts such as that between the
Kyoto Protocol and the Convention on Biological Diversity.
Even the governance capacity of a WEO designed according to the EU model
would have notable limits. The attractiveness and power of the EU stem primarily
from the advantages oﬀered by the single market as opposed to the prospect of
participating in European environmental governance. The same is true for the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the accompanying North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and its Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (Runge 2001). A similar link to other policy ﬁelds
would presumably not be part of a newly established WEO, because it would
transform the concept of a World Environment Organisation into something much
broader. A WEO integrating only environmental issue-areas could not be expected
to resolve the enforcement problems encountered with respect to collective envi-
ronmental goods referred to in Section 4.2. Even the most stringent supervisory and
enforcement mechanism could not prevent non-compliant countries from taking a
free ride on members by leaving the organisation or ignoring its rules. The notable
strength of EU enforcement of environmental regulation is in particular due to the
linkage with other policies such as single market policy and agricultural and regional
policies, rather than the particular design of environmental policy making. For the
same reason, such a WEO could not be expected to mitigate tensions with economic
institutions such as the WTO.
Finally, even the most powerful ‘supranational’ WEO is unlikely to raise sub-
stantial additional ﬁnancial resources. There is no reason to assume that the
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integration of issue-areas and the reorganisation of decision-making processes would
increase the preparedness of member states to provide additional contributions.
Paying EU member states have not been willing to agree to and maintain a massive
transfer of ﬁnancial resources in the framework of the EU Structural Funds and the
EU Common Agricultural Policy because of the desirability of the goals pursued
thereby, but because of the substantial beneﬁts they reap from European integration
in other areas (e.g., single market, monetary union). Similar trade-oﬀs beyond the
ﬁeld of the environment are not in sight for a WEO.
Most important, a ‘supranational’ WEO relying on the EU model cannot be
expected to be realised in the foreseeable future, because this would require the
transfer of far-reaching competencies to an international organisation. Suprana-
tionalism has been conﬁned to the EU so far where it depends on a comparatively
high degree of political, economic and social coherence in a single region of the
world. We cannot see any indication that a signiﬁcant number of states from dif-
ferent regions would be prepared to consider ceding sovereignty to an international
institution to the extent required.
5. Conclusion
The establishment of a World Environment Organisation does not promise to en-
hance international environmental governance. Currently, this governance occurs
through hundreds of separate international regimes and is characterised by a high
degree of institutional fragmentation. Proponents of a WEO aim at integrating
existing regimes into a more centralised institution in order to improve decision-
making, implementation and co-ordination in international environmental gover-
nance. However, they have largely failed to answer the fundamental question of how
and why governance within the framework of an organisation would be superior to
the status quo. From an institutionalist perspective, proposals for establishing a
WEO lack promise because such an institution cannot at the same time be realistic,
signiﬁcant and beneﬁcial for international environmental governance.
Any institutional reform can signiﬁcantly aﬀect international environmental gov-
ernance only if it succeeds in modifying the design of the decision-making processes
applied in international environmental institutions and the scope of the issue-areas
covered by these institutions. International institutions consist of systems of rules and
norms that are established and developed by their members in order to govern distinct
issue-areas. The design of their decision-making procedures and the scope of their
issue-areas are important determinants of their governance capacity. Replacing the
consensus principle currently prevailing in international relations at least partially with
majority voting and delegation of decision-making authority to limited-membership
bodies and independent agencies could substantially enhance the ability to arrive at
decisions in international institutions. An issue-area’s ideal scope will be reached if it
allows for suﬃcient trade-oﬀs between issues so as to ensure net beneﬁts for all major
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actors, while preventing negotiations from becoming over-complex and unmanage-
able. From an institutionalist perspective, any signiﬁcant eﬀect of an institutional
reform of international environmental governance will be based on modiﬁcations
either of decision-making processes or of boundaries of issue-areas or of both. Such
institutional reform can help strengthen environmental interests but it cannot sub-
stitute for a lack of political interest in and support for environmental protection.
The establishment of an organisation as such does not promise to signiﬁcantly
improve international environmental governance. International organisations pos-
sessing legal personality and bureaucracies do not a priori possess a higher gover-
nance capacity than international regimes, which are based upon one or several
international treaties short of possessing legal personality. Neither are international
organisations throughout characterised by particularly far-reaching decision-making
procedures, nor is the construction of the issue-areas governed necessarily superior
to international regimes. Both organisations and regimes delegate decision-making
authority and employ majority decision-making to varying extents, with sophisti-
cated decision-making within international environmental regimes reaching far be-
yond arrangements found in many international organisations. Both of them can
govern smaller or larger problem areas depending on whether the respective area
allows for the emergence of international co-operation. Finally, there are both
examples of more and less eﬀective international organisations and international
regimes, and many environmental regimes appear to be particularly successful.
Depending on its design, a newly established WEO could either constitute sym-
bolic action, or create a host of negative side-eﬀects, or be unrealistic. A WEO
designed according to the UN model would assemble the existing environmental
regimes under a common roof without aﬀecting the scope of their issue-areas or their
decision-making procedures. Creating this umbrella organisation would be a sym-
bolic act that would have little or no eﬀects on governance. In contrast, a WEO
following the WTO model would profoundly change decision-making by systemat-
ically integrating existing environmental issue-areas and leading to comprehensive
‘‘world environment rounds’’. As a consequence, however, the complexity of nego-
tiation rounds would increase, while opponents of parts of the comprehensive
package would face incentives to stay outside the institution or ignore part of its
regulations. A WEO relying upon the EU model could be expected to successfully
avoid the complexity trap. Members would be requested to accept majority decision-
making and delegation of decision-making authority and would be faced with the
choice of either accepting all or none of the decisions taken within the WEO. While
this WEO would have some prospect of contributing to solving the problems of
international environmental governance, it would require a far-reaching transfer of
competencies from nation states to the organisation. Since such a transfer is cur-
rently widely unacceptable for states in the international system, an EU-like WEO
can be considered grossly utopian.
The eﬀectiveness of any WEO, however designed, would remain limited by the
particular problem structure prevailing in international environmental governance.
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AWEO would hardly be able to prevent countries from taking a free ride on faithful
members by staying outside the organisation or ignoring their obligations. It also
cannot be expected per se to enhance the preparedness of member states to provide
increased ﬁnancial funds for environmental protection. There are ample opportu-
nities for improving the current institutional arrangements of international envi-
ronmental governance. Eﬀorts to enhance the eﬀectiveness of new and emerging
sectoral environmental regimes may be complemented by endeavours aiming at
improved eﬃciency and coherence by integrating secretariat services and meetings of
parties and strengthening the catalytic and facilitative role of UNEP short of
establishing a WEO. From an institutionalist perspective, environmental protection
will be better served if the political resources available are invested in achieving
progress in the development of the existing institutional arrangements.
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Note
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References
Abbott, K. W. and D. Snidal (1998), ‘Why States Act through Formal International Orga-
nizations’, Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 42(1), 3–32.
Barnett, M. N. and M. Finnemore (1999), ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of Interna-
tional Organizations’, International Organization 53(4), 699–732.
Beisheim, M., S. Dreher, G. Walter, B. Zangl and M. Zu¨rn (1999), Im Zeitalter der Globali-
sierung? Thesen und Daten zur gesellschaftlichen und politischen Denationalisierung. Baden-
Baden: Nomos.
Biermann, F. (2000), ‘The Case for a World Environment Organization’, Environment 42(9),
22–31.
Biermann, F. (2001), ‘The Emerging Debate on the Need for a World Environment Organi-
zation: A Commentary’, Global Environmental Politics 1(1), 45–55.
Biermann, F. (2002), ‘Strengthening Green Global Governance in a Disparate World Society:
Would a World Environment Organisation Beneﬁt the South?’, International Environ-
mental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 2(4), 297–315.
Brack, D. (2002), ‘Environmental Treaties and Trade: Multilateral Environmental Agree-
ments and the Multilateral Trading System’, in G. P. Sampson and W. Bradney Chambers,
eds., Trade, Environment, and the Millennium, 2nd edn. (pp. 321–352) Tokyo: UN Uni-
versity Press.
Charnovitz, S. (1996), ‘Trade Measures and the Design of International Regimes’, Journal of
Environment and Development 5(2), 168–196.
SEBASTIAN OBERTHU¨R AND THOMAS GEHRING378
Charnovitz, S. (1998), ‘The World Trade Organization and the Environment’, Yearbook of
International Environmental Law 8, 98–116.
Charnovitz, S. (2002), ‘A World Environment Organization’, Columbia Journal of Environ-
mental Law 27(2), 321–357.
Churchill, R. R. and G. Ulfstein (2000), ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multi-
lateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’,
The American Journal of International Law 94, 623–659.
Cornes, R. and T. Sandler (1999), The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods,
2nd edn Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
de la Cruz, H. B., G. Potobsky and L. Swepston (1996), The International Labor Organization.
The International Standards System and Basic Human Rights. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
DeSombre, E. R. and J. Kauﬀman (1996), ‘The Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund: Partial
Success Story’, in R. O. Keohane and M. A. Levy, eds., Institutions for Environmental Aid:
Pitfalls and Promise (pp. 89–126). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Edelman, M. (1967), The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana, Chicago, London: University of
Illinois Press.
Ehrmann, M. (2000), Erfu¨llungskontrolle im Umweltvo¨lkerrecht – Verfahren der Erfu¨llungs-
kontrolle in der umweltvo¨lkerrechtlichen Vertragspraxis. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Elster, J. (1989), The Cement of Society. A Study of Social Order. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Esty, D. C. (1994), Greening the GATT. Trade, Environment and the Future. Washington, DC:
Institute for International Economics.
Esty, D. C. and M. Ivanova (2001): Making International Environmental Agreements Work:
The Case for a Global Environmental Organization, Yale Center for Environmental Law
and Policy Working Paper Series, Working Paper 2/1. New Haven, May 2001.
Esty, D. C. and M. Ivanova (2002), ‘Revitalizing Global Environmental Governance: A
Function Driven Approach’, in D. C. Esty and M. Ivanova, eds., Global Environmental
Governance: Options and Opportunities (pp. 181–204). New Haven, CT: Yale School of
Forestry and Environmental Studies.
Gehring, T. (1994), Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions for International Environ-
mental Governance. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang.
Gehring, T. (2002), Die Europa¨ische Union als komplexe internationale Organisation. Wie durch
Kommunikation und Entscheidung soziale Ordnung entsteht. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Gross Stein, J. (1989), ‘Getting to the Table: The Triggers, Stages, Functions, and Conse-
quences of Pre-negotiation’, in J. Gross Stein, ed., Getting to the Table: The Processes of
International Pre-negotiation (pp. 239–268). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.
Gupta, J. (2002), ‘Global Sustainable Development Governance: Institutional Challenges
from a Theoretical Perspective’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and
Economics 2(4), 361–388.
Haas, E. B. (1975), ‘Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence,
and the Construction of International Regimes’, International Organization 29(3), 827–
876.
Haas, P. M. (1992), ‘Banning Chloroﬂuorocarbons: Epistemic Community Eﬀorts to Protect
Stratospheric Ozone’, International Organization 46(1), 187–224.
Haas, P. M., R. O. Keohane and M. A. Levy (eds.) (1993), Institutions for the Earth. Sources of
Eﬀective International Environmental Protection. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
Hoekman, B. M. and M. M. Kostecki (1995), The Political Economy of the World Trading
System. From GATT to WTO. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Jackson, J. H. (1999), The World Trading System. Law and Policy of International Economic
Relations, 2nd edn Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
REFORMING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 379
Jacquemont, F. and A. Caparro´s (2002), ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity and the
Climate Change Convention 10 Years After Rio: Towards a Synergy of the Two Re-
gimes?’, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 11(2), 139–
180.
Keohane, R. O. (1989), International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International
Relations Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Keohane, R. O. (1993), ‘The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-
American Research Programme’, in V. Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International
Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Koremenos, B., C. Lipson and D. Snidal (2001), ‘The Rational Design of International
Institutions’, International Organization 55(4), 761–799.
Lax, D. A. and J. K. Sebenius (1986), The Manager as Negotiator. Bargaining for Cooperation
and Competitive Gain. New York, NY: Free Press.
Levy, M. A., O. R. Young and M. Zu¨rn (1995), ‘The Study of International Regimes’,
European Journal of International Relations 1, 267–330.
Majone, G. (1997), ‘The New European Agencies. Regulation by Information’, Journal of
European Public Policy 4(2), 262–275.
Miles,E.L.,A.Underdal, S.Andresen,K.Lee, J.B.Skjærsethand J.Wettestad (2001),Explaining
Regime Eﬀectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mingst, K. A. and M. P. Karns (2000), United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era. Boulder, CO:
Westview.
Moravcsik, A. (1998), The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to
Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Najam, A. (2003), ‘The Case against a New International Environmental Organization’,
Global Governance 9(3), 367–384.
Oberthu¨r, S. (2002), ‘Clustering of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Potentials and
Limitations’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 2(4),
317–340.
Oberthu¨r, S. and S. Marr (2002), ‘Das System der Erfu¨llungskontrolle des Kyoto-Protokolls:
Ein Schritt zur wirksamen Durchsetzung im Umweltvo¨lkerrecht’, Zeitschrift fu¨r Um-
weltrecht 13(2), 81–89.
Oberthu¨r, S. and T. Gehring (2003), ‘Institutional Interaction: Toward a Systematic Analysis’,
2003 International Studies Association Annual Convention, Portland, 26 February – 1 March
2003.
Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.
Paarlberg, R. L. (1999), ‘Lapsed Leadership: U.S. International Environmental Policy Since
Rio’, in N. J. Vig and R. S. Axelrod, eds., The Global Environment: Institutions, Law, and
Policy (pp. 236–255). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Parson, E. A. (2003), Protecting the Ozone Layer: Science, Strategy, and Negotiation in the
Shaping of a Global Environmental Regime. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pierson, P. (1996), ‘The Path to European Integration. A Historical Institutionalist Analysis’,
Comparative Political Studies 29(2), 123–163.
Pollack, M. (2003), The Engines of European Integration. Delegation, Agency, and Agenda
Setting in the EU. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Pontecorvo, C. M. (1999), ‘Interdependence between Global Environmental Regimes: The
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change and Forest Protection’, Zeitschrift fu¨r ausla¨ndisches
o¨ﬀentliches Recht und Vo¨lkerrecht 59(3), 709–749.
Risse, T. (2000), ‘Let’s Argue!’ Communicative Action in World Politics’, International
Organization 54(1), 1–39.
SEBASTIAN OBERTHU¨R AND THOMAS GEHRING380
Runge, C. F. (2001), ‘A Global Environment Organization (GEO) and the World Trading
System’, Journal of World Trade 35(4), 399–426.
Sand, P. H. (ed.) (1992), The Eﬀectiveness of International Environmental Agreements. A
Survey of Existing Legal Instruments. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Scharpf, F. W. (1991), ‘Games Real Actors Could Play. The Challenge of Complexity’,
Journal of Theoretical Politics 3(3), 277–304.
Sebenius, J. K. (1983), ‘Negotiation Arithmetics: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties’,
International Organization 37(2), 281–316.
Sebenius, J. K. (1984), Negotiating the Law of the Sea. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.
Simmons, B. A. and L. L. Martin (2002), ‘International Organizations and Institutions’, in W.
Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons, eds.,Handbook of International Relations (pp. 192–
211). London: Sage.
Tollison, R. D. and T. D. Willett (1979), ‘An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous
Issue Linkages in International Negotiations’, International Organization 33(4), 425–449.
Victor, D. G., K. Raustiala and E. B. Skolnikoﬀ (eds.) (1998), The Implementation and
Eﬀectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice. Cam-
bridge, MA, and London: MIT Press.
UNEP (2002), Global Environment Outlook 3. London: Earthscan.
WBGU (German Advisory Council on Global Change) (2001), World in Transition: New
Structures for Global Environmental Policy, London: Earthscan.
Weiler, J. H. H. (1991), ‘The Transformation of Europe’, Yale Law Journal 100(8), 2403–2483.
Whalley, J. and B. Zissimos (2001), ‘What Could a World Environmental Organization Do?’,
Global Environmental Politics 1(1), 29–44.
Whalley, J. and B. Zissimos (2002), ‘Making Environmental Deals: The Economic Case for a
World Environment Organization’, in D. C. Esty and M. Ivanova, eds., Global Environ-
mental Governance: Options and Opportunities (pp. 163–180). New Haven, CT: Yale School
of Forestry and Environmental Studies.
White, N. D. (2002), The United Nations System. Toward International Justice. Boulder,
London: Lynne Rienner.
Williamson, O. E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms, Markets, Relational
Contracting. New York: Free Press.
Young, O. R. (1994), International Governance. Protecting the Environment in a Stateless
Society. Ithaca: Cornell UP.
Young, O. R. (ed.) (1999), The Eﬀectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal
Connections and Behavioural Mechanisms. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
REFORMING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 381
